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BLACK HILLS/WHITE JUSTICE: THE Sioux NATION VERSUS THE 
UNITED STATES, 1775 TO THE PRESENT. By Edward Lazarus. New 
York: HarperCollins. 1991. Pp. xvii, 486. $27.50. 
In 1980, the U.S. Supreme Court in United States v. Sioux Nation 1 
awarded the Sioux $106 million, concluding the nearly sixty-year-old 
Black Hills legal battle. To the Sioux, however, the ruling was a 
hollow victory; they rejected the judgment, holding to their claim that 
"the Black Hills are not for sale" (pp. 326, 351, 353-54, 373, 403-28). 
In Black Hills/White Justice, Edward Lazarus, whose father2 rep-
resented the tribal interests for over twenty years, succinctly relates 
the history of the Black Hills claim. The book contributes signifi-
cantly to Native American legal history by tracing, in considerable 
detail, the legal maneuvering along the dispute's meandering path. 
Nevertheless, Lazarus' efforts to glorify his father taint his effort.3 
Lazarus separates Black Hills/White Justice into three periods: 
the events leading to the Black Hills Claim (1775-1890), the early his-
tory of the claim (1890-1956), and the post-1956 era of judicial and 
legislative activity through the present (1956-1991). The first six 
chapters - describing events from the Sioux's first encounter with the 
Black Hills to the massacre at Wounded Knee - provide background 
for the subsequent fifty years of legal wrangling. The remainder of the 
book tells two stories: first, the legal battles - mostly conducted in 
Washington, D.C. - for the Black Hills, and, second, the changes in 
the Indians' way of life and in the U.S. government's relationship with 
the Sioux. 
The Sioux Tribe first came upon the Black Hills at the time of the 
American Revolution (p. 3). Encounters with expansion-minded 
America soon followed and ultimately led to the subjugation of the 
Sioux and their consequent removal to reservations. Military confron-
1. 448 U.S. 371 (1980). 
2. Arthur Lazarus represented the Sioux from the late 1950s into the 1980s. 
3. Lazarus may feel the need to laud his father because of the criticism the attorney received 
for allegedly blindly pursuing a money award and contingency fee instead of the Black Hills 
themselves. See Stuart Taylor, Jr., Big Wampum for a Legal Tribe, N.Y. TIMES, May 3, 1981, 
§ 3, at 1 ("The lawyers, motivated more by the prospect of a big fee than the desire to right 
ancient wrongs .•• finally won a huge pot of money for their clients, from which they are to be 
richly rewarded themselves."). In commenting on the $10.6 million legal fee obtained by the 
Sioux's attorneys, the author Peter Matthiessen states that "[t]he case had been won by the 
wealthy lawyer and lost by his poverty-stricken clients ...• " PETER MA1THIESSEN, IN THE 
SPIRIT OF CRAZY HORSE 528 (1983). Black Hills/White Justice, in contrast, tells a story in 
which attorneys get the best remedy available but their unreasonable and ungrateful clients find 
their result wanting and motives questionable. In addition, Lazarus does not spare the reader 
from hyperbolic praise for his father: e.g., "[s]mall and slight, ordinarily reserved, in court Laza-
rus transformed himself into a[n] assassin of professional credibility." P. 281. 
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tation, however, did not ruin the Sioux; their inability to maintain the 
Indian's nomadic way of life was their undoing: 
[T]hey had lost, not on the battlefield, but on their hunting grounds, 
where the buffalo no longer grazed, or at the army posts where a de-
bauched but easy life weaned them from their habits. They were casual-
ties in a war between two cultures, first made desperate and weary by a 
long and steady assault on their way of life, then broken by their conse-
quent dependence on government annuity payments for survival.4 
The Black Hills claim arose from two significant events: the sign-
ing of the treaty of 1868 that granted the Black Hills to the Sioux, and 
its subsequent abrogation by the United States in 1877. Black Hills/ 
White Justice elucidates these two milestones. 
Following increasing skirmishes through the late 1850s and early 
1860s, the U.S. government decided to make peace with the Sioux 
rather than remove them by military force. 5 After acceding to all the 
Sioux demands - "the only time in U.S. history the country had 
fought a war, then decided to negotiate a peace on the enemies' terms" 
(p. 48) - the Sioux chiefs and U.S. government signed the treaty of 
1868 to create the Great Sioux Reservation.6 
The ensuing peace was short-lived. Discovery of gold in the Black 
Hills7 and Sioux resistance to reservation policy ultimately led the 
United States to a military solution (pp. 70-90). In 1877, the govern-
ment "deliver[ed] the nation's ultimatum, which, in its simplest terms, 
gave the Sioux the choice to die in battle, to die from starvation, or to 
surrender everything they held of value" (p. 90). The "agreement"8 
was forced on the recalcitrant Sioux - only 10% of the tribe signed 
(p. 92) - and it took away the Hills in return for subsistence rations. 
This agreement formed the foundation for the protracted legal strug-
gle between the Sioux and the U.S. government. 
Lazarus maintains that from the outset the Sioux regarded their 
claim as seeking more than justice from their conquerors; the "Black 
Hills claim emerged as one of the few bridges to a cherished past" (p. 
119). It became a "rallyiJig point and rare source of hope" for a peo-
4. Pp. 36-37. The author states that Sioux dependence on the government began with their 
reliance on the white man's guns, cooking utensils, and other items (p. 11), grew through the 
early reservation years when they resisted adopting agricultural life (p. 103), and continues today 
as the Sioux remain extremely impoverished (p. 420). 
5. P. 43. To achieve this goal, some government officials advocated stepped-up military ac-
tion while others, couching their arguments in moral declarations, pursued a reservation policy. 
The latter policy won out because "Americans had grown apprehensive after the Civil War about 
their army" (p. 42), feeding the Indians was cheaper than fighting them (p. 43), and the reserva-
tion system "was ideally suited to a nation [the United States] that yearned for expansion with 
honor'' (p. 45). 
6. Fort Laramie Treaty of Apr. 29, 1868, 15 Stat. 635 (1869). 
7. General Custer, in clear violation of the 1868 treaty, led an expedition into the Black Hills 
and discovered gold in 1874. Pp. 72-75. 
8. Act of Feb. 28, 1877, 19 Stat. 254 (1877). 
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ple otherwise facing the loss of their culture (p. 133). During gather-
ings the tribal elders would pass "the torch of accusation to the next 
generation, and vest[] in their children and grandchildren the power 
of their people's tragic history to inspire the compassion of their con-
querors" (p. 120). 
Lazarus relates a number of obstacles the Sioux faced in initiating 
their claim. Although they remained unversed in legal interpretation 
(pp. 121-22), the tribe knew that the government had somehow 
cheated them. This was verified when the Sioux discovered the gov-
ernment's violation of the three-fourths voting requirement for land 
sales. 9 Yet the government banned the tribe from securing legal assist-
ance (p. 124), and, even if they secured counsel, sovereign immunity 
protected the U.S. government. The Indian Bureau - which held 
trustee-like responsibility for the tribe's well-being - offered little 
assistance to overcome these problems (p. 125). Lazarus lucidly ex-
plains the paradox of the government's position toward the Sioux: 
"No nation could serve effectively both as guardian of the claimant 
and as prospective defendant in the claimant's litigation. On [the] 
Black Hills, the Indian Bureau was a reluctant advocate indeed" (p. 
135). 
Despite these obstructions, the Sioux undertook a lobbying effort 
to persuade enactment of a bill allowing the Court of Claims to hear 
their grievances (pp. 132-33). On June 3, 1920, Congress passed the 
Sioux Jurisdictional Act10 to reward the Indians for their patriotic 
contribution in World War I and to facilitate assimilation of the tribes: 
"Past injustices, the Wilsonians believed, whether real or imagined, 
made poor soil for good citizenship to take root" (p. 131 ). Despite 
these lofty goals, the legislation limited potential recovery; it provided 
only monetary remedies, barred interest on the judgment, and allowed 
government offsets - the deduction of money it spent supporting the 
Sioux from any judgment it might have to pay them (pp. 137-38). The 
Sioux were nevertheless pleased to possess an opportunity to present 
their case. 
Lazarus' extensive description of lawyers' roles, which distin-
guishes Black Hills/White Justice from other historical treatments of 
the subject, 11 begins with his description of the origin of the legal bat-
tle (pp. 138-40). After Congress passed the jurisdictional act, attor-
neys with the gleam of Black Hills gold in their eyes maneuvered to 
obtain the Sioux business. Ralph Case, who Lazarus depicts as an 
affable and sympathetic attorney who romanticized the U.S. judicial 
9. See Art. XII, 15 Stat. at 639. The text of the Fort Laramie agreement is reprinted at pp. 
433-49. 
10. Act of June 3, 1920, 41 Stat. 738 (1920). 
11. See, e.g., VINE DELORIA, JR. & CLIFFORD M. LYTLE, AMERICAN INDIANS, AMERICAN 
JUSTICE 1-24, 40-45 (1983); Matthiessen, supra note 3. 
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process, emerged from the disarray as co-counsel with three other at-
tomeys.12 Case filed the Black Hills money claim on May 7, 1923, 
forty-seven years after the taking of the Hills. 13 He based the action 
on stories gathered from the Sioux - accounts of the government's 
offering food and blankets as bribes, intimidating the tribe members, 
and offering liquor to weaken Sioux wills - showing that the tribe 
members unwittingly signed the treaty of 1877.14 Nearly twenty years 
later, the Supreme Court declined review of the Court of Claims deci-
sion against the Sioux.15 The Indians had come to know the sluggish 
pace of white justice. 
Lazarus asserts that Case lost the opening skirmish of the legal war 
by relying too heavily on facts and too sparingly on legal analysis. 
Case's 500-page statement of fact "was an impassioned work . . . , 
more the creation of a crusader than a lawyer" (p. 167). In contrast, 
his legal brief, submitted almost three years later, ran a mere eighteen 
pages and inadequately covered the pertinent law (pp. 168, 173). Such 
sparse legal analysis presented few prospects for success before a court 
that had previously been miserly in its remedies for broken treaties (p. 
168). The brief did not address the government's best arguments: the 
limitations of the 1920 Jurisdictional Act and the application of key 
precedent. 16 · 
In 1946, Congress breathed new life into the Black Hills claim by 
enacting the Indian Claims Commission Act (ICCA),17 which formed 
a commission to consider a broad range of Indian grievances. Case, 
advancing similar legal arguments, lost before the commission. 18 Fi-
nally recognizing Case's incompetence, the Sioux replaced their attor-
ney of thirty-five years. The Sioux initially struggled to find new 
12. Pp. 138-43. After selection, the attorneys determined the distribution of the fees: "Ban-
dit gangs would have had an easier time dividing up their loot than these lawyers" (p. 144). 
13. P. 146. See MATIHIESSEN, supra note 3, at 31 (arguing that the money claim was filed 
despite Case's awareness that "his clients sought the return of" the Black Hills); Edward A. 
Adams, Whose Land Is It, Anyway?, NATL. L.J., Aug. 3, 1987, at 20, 22, 24. 
14. P. 155. "In truth, the hundreds of pages of Sioux recollections, fifty years removed from 
the facts, were sometimes self-contradictory, other times made of whole cloth. • • • Still, taken 
collectively, to the Indians and to a sympathetic advocate like Case, the stories amounted to an 
irrefutable indictment of the United States for deceit, coercion, and, ultimately, theft." P. 155. 
15. In an obscure opinion - "a masterpiece of judicial obfuscation" (p. 175)- the Court of 
Claims apparently dismissed the claim for lack of jurisdiction. Sioux Tribe v. United States, 97 
Ct. Cl. 613 (1942), cert. denied, 318 U.S. 789 (1943). Arguments about whether they had actu-
ally reached the merits would remain largely unresolved. P. 176. One reason for the decision 
may have been the court's reluctance to grant one tribe a $750 million settlement during the 
costly World War II. P. 177. 
16. P. 173; see Lone Wolf v. Hitchcock, 187 U.S. 553, 565 (1903) (establishing Congress' 
plenary power to manage Indian lands). 
17. Indian Claims Commission Act of 1946, ch. 959., § 1, Pub. L. No. 79-726 (omitted from 
25 U.S.C. § 70 on termination of the Commission on Sept. 30, 1978, pursuant to Pub. L. No. 94-
465, sec. 2, 90 Stat. 1990 (1976)). 
18. Sioux Tribe v. United States, 2 Ind. Cl. Comm. 646 (1954), ajfd., 146 F. Supp. 229 (Ct. 
Cl. 1956). 
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counsel willing to take up their botched claim. Eventually, six of eight 
tribal councils hired the firm Strasser, Spielberg, Fried and Frank, 
whose practice dealt extensively with Indian law. The firm revived the 
claim by attacking the source of its infirmity; in a motion to vacate and 
remand, accepted by the Court of Claims, 19 the attorneys vigorously 
argued that the Sioux had in effect lacked legal representation. 20 
The two leading attorneys on the case, Marvin Sonosky and Ar-
thur Lazarus, initially took "a 'kitchen sink' approach to the Sioux 
claims" (p. 239). They fought Case's relinquishment of certain claims 
and his acknowledgment of fifty-seven million dollars in government 
offsets. After convincing the Justice Department to try the case on the 
merits21 and overcoming the ICCA's footdragging, counsel for the 
Sioux finally began a new trial in 1961 (p. 248). Lazarus describes the 
stratagems of the Sioux's attorneys in interesting blow-by-blow detail. 
First, the lawyers developed legal arguments based on the unconscio-
nability of the government's actions and, more importantly, on the 
notion that the Black Hills affair constituted a taking without just 
compensation.22 Next, they undertook the difficult process of deter-
mining the fair market value, as of 1877, of the usurped Indian land 
(pp. 275-85). Finally, Sonosky and Lazarus fought the government's 
res judicata defense based on the 1942 Court of Claims opinion (p. 
317). 
The claims commission decision23 "gave the Sioux a great victory 
on the one hand and then took almost all of it away with the other" (p. 
319). The commission rejected the resjudicata defense and valued the 
hills at close to what the Sioux's counsel had sought. Liberal govern-
ment offsets, however, threatened to negate the potential remedy (p. 
324). To avoid this result, Sonosky and Lazarus shifted their battle to 
Congress, seeking to amend the ICCA Act of 1946 to exclude most of 
the government offsets.24 The Sioux's attorneys lobbied the House, 
Senate, and White House and argued that "the government committed 
two wrongs: first, it deprived the Sioux of their livelihood; secondly, it 
deprived the Sioux of their land. What the United States gave back in 
19. Sioux Tribe v. United States, 182 Ct. Cl. 912 (1968). 
20. Pp. 228-29. Lazarus describes the motion: "Ralph Case's representation of the Sioux 
was so 'grossly incompetent,' the record he established so 'distorted and empty,' his arguments so 
'erroneous and untenable,' his briefs so 'inaccurate and wholly misleading,' that 'for all practical 
purposes, these Indians were without legal representation.'" P. 228. 
21. P. 240. Lazarus criticizes the Justice Department's role as an "over-zealous" advocate, 
to the detriment of Congress' goal to resolve the tribal claims "fairly and expeditiously.'' P. 241. 
The government was in pursuit of "procedural (if not substantive) justice.'' P. 240. 
22. Pp. 266-75. Lazarus recounts the attorneys' reinterpretation of the 1868 treaty that ac-
knowledged Sioux ownership rights in contested lands. They reasoned that because the govern-
ment had seized the Hills in 1877, the Agreement was null and void for lack of consideration. 
23. Sioux Nation v. United States, 33 Ind. Cl. Comm. 151 (1974). 
24. These included "food, rations, or provisions,'' which effectively constituted almost all of 
the government's offsets. P. 330. 
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rations should not be stretched to cover both wrongs" (p. 330). After 
convincing congressional members that the bill did not show undue 
preference to the Sioux, Congress passed a unique amendment to the 
ICCA that cleared the way for a monetary judgment.25 
Victory would have to wait. On appeal the Court of Claims re-
versed the ICCA's res judicata ruling.26 After the Supreme Court de-
nied review, the Sioux's counsel again found themselves on Capitol 
Hill pressing Congress "to waive a scrupulously honored legal defense, 
res judicata, so that a single tribe might reassert a legal claim already 
fifty-three years in litigation, and at a potential cost to the United 
States of more than $85 million" (p. 347). They overcame arguments 
that a waiver of the defense would set bad precedent and would lead to 
"congressional interference in judicial business" by showing the 
unique and technical nature of the proposed waiver and by appealing 
to "the tragic story behind the Black Hills claim" (p. 352). After a 
long and arduous campaign (pp. 356-57, 360-65), the res judicata 
waiver became law in 1978.2' 
The Court of Claims reheard the case (pp. 367-70, 373) and en-
tered judgment for the Sioux (p. 375); the Supreme Court affirmed.28 
In an ironic twist of events, the Sioux tribal governments rejected the 
monetary remedy (p. 404), demanding the actual return of the Black 
Hills. 
Throughout his recounting of the legal battle, Lazarus describes 
the changing attitudes of the Sioux toward the Black Hills claim. 
When Sonosky and Arthur Lazarus first took over the case, the Sioux 
still held out hope that the Black Hills claim was a path to wealth.29 
In the 1960s, a new generation of Sioux leaders, reacting to the tribal 
termination policy of the 1950s, sought to exercise their sovereignty 
rights. 30 A faction of growing importance developed its own interpre-
tation of the 1868 treaty; its members "preached the gospel of Indian 
nationalism: a tale of genocide and resurrection in the form of abso-
lute tribal sovereignty" (p. 293). 
The newly formed American Indian Movement (AIM) led the 
group. Lazarus castigates AIM by referring to them as "militants" 
25. P. 336. Act of Oct. 27, 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-494, 25 U.S.C. § 70(a) {1976). 
26. United States v. Sioux Nation, 518 F.2d 1293 (Ct. Cl. 1975), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1016 
(1975). The author extensively recounts the legal arguments presented to the Court of Claims on 
both sides of the issue and briefly discusses the Court's opinion. Pp. 336-45. 
27. Act of Mar. 13, 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-243, 92 Stat. 153 (omitted from 25 U.S.C. § 70 on 
termination of the Commission on Sept. 30, 1978, pursuant to Pub. L. No. 94-465, sec. 2, 90 
Stat. 1990 {1976)). 
28. Pp. 381-401; see Sioux Nation v. United States, 601 F.2d 1157 (Ct. Cl. 1979), ajfd., 448 
U.S. 371 (1980). The author details the legal conflicts and the process by which the Court de-
cided the claim. 
29. MATIHIESSEN, supra note 3, at 31; see also pp. 232-33, 235-36, 250. 
30. The book has a decidedly negative image of the Indian reform movement that began in 
the late 1960s. See ch. 12. 
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(pp. 293, 294). His rhetorical gesture is reminiscent of the treatment 
of earlier natives who fought for their rights and were thus branded as 
"hostiles" or "renegades."31 Deriding them as "a bunch of city Indi-
ans talking about the old ways as though they knew something about 
them" (p. 296), he blames them for divisiveness within the tribes. 32 
In addition, Lazarus defends the tribal governments established 
under the Indian Reorganization Act from AIM's criticisms. 33 
Although admitting that these governments "were often poorly, and 
sometimes dishonorably, run" (p. 294), "AIM's criticisms were wide 
of the mark. On most reservations, even those with poor leadership, 
tribal self-rule was real, not a sham; leadership was elected, not im-
posed" (p. 295). The tribal governments lacked experience in self-rule, 
Lazarus asserts, but understood the limits on their power: 
Tribal leaders sought self-determination as pragmatists coping with mili-
tary impotence, political weakness, and almost total economic depen-
dence on the federal government. They accepted, or at least , 
accommodated themselves to, the overarching jurisdiction o( the United 
States; they searched for autonomy or justice in its institutions, accord-
ing to its legal rules. And they accepted, or at least accommodated 
themselves to, the historical process by which individual Indians had 
become full citizens of the United States', fought in its wars, and partly 
shared its destiny. [p. 296] 
Lazarus' views of tribal politics presume the legitimacy of the tri-
bal councils created under the Indian Reorganization Act. The Act 
filled the perceived void in Indian political organization with a system 
of governments based on a white American model. The Act also es-
tablished parties with whom the U.S. government could deal; intra-
tribal factionalism had often obscured who held tribal power in the 
past. 34 Before the passage of the IRA, however, the tribes already pos-
sessed identifiable governments - the Black Hills Treaty Council be-
ing one example. 35 "Traditional Indians" generally dominated these 
shadow governments, and they decried the recognized tribal councils 
for "imposing white institutions on the tribes."36 Lazarus disparages 
31. See, e.g., MATIHIESSEN, supra note 3, at 76. 
32. Pp. 294-311. For a more sympathetic view of AIM, see MATIHIESSEN, supra note 3, at 
xxiv ("whatever AIM's origins, excesses, and mistakes, [its] warrior spirit ... restored identity 
and pride to thousands of defeated people and inspired attempts to resurrect the dying languages 
and culture."). Matthiessen also notes that AIM "was eventually endorsed by spiritual leaders of 
many Indian nations who saw these young militants as the last ... hope of their people." Id. at 
40. 
33. Indian Reorganization Act, 25 U.S.C. § 461-79 (1988). 
34. Pp. 160-61. See DELORIA & LYTLE, supra note 11, at 15; Robert F. Berkhofer, Jr., 
Cultural Pluralism Versus Ethnocentrism. in THE AMERICAN INDIAN AND THE PROBLEM OF 
HlsrORY 35, 39 (Calvin Martin ed., 1987) [hereinafter PROBLEM OF HlsrORY]; Vine Deloria, Jr., 
Revision and Reversion, in PROBLEM OF HisrORY, supra, at 84, 88. 
35. Deloria, supra note 34, at 88. , 
36. DELORIA & LYTLE, supra note 11, at 15; see VINE DELORIA, JR. & CLIFFORD LYTLE, 
THE NATIONS WITHIN: THE PAsr AND FUTURE OF AMERICAN INDIAN SOVEREIGNTY, 232-
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the role of the traditionals, describing the nonrecognized leadership as 
factional and beholden to a vanished past.37 Apparently, he felt it nec-
essary to attack those elements of the Sioux nation that opposed the 
just compensation claim. 
The Commission's 1974 decision to grant just compensation to the 
Sioux38 "alerted the militants to an irreconcilable conflict between 
their strict adherence to the terms of the 1868 treaty and the Sioux 
nation's half-century old effort to attain compensation for the Black 
Hills" (p. 325). The militants contended that the 1868 treaty defined 
the relationship between the Sioux and the United States and had 
granted the Black Hills to the tribe. "Seeking compensation for the 
taking of the Black Hills was not only logically absurd, it represented 
a capitulation to U.S. treaty breaking, a sellout to white and capitalist 
notions that land and money were interchangeable, or, more crassly, 
that the Sioux and their lands could be bought" (p. 325). The Sioux 
attorneys initially disregarded this sentiment because the "elected tri-
bal councils still stood firmly behind the claim" (p. 326). 
The conviction that "[t]he Black Hills are not for sale" (p. 373) 
drew a broader and louder following throughout Sonosky and Laza-
rus' representation. "Traditionals" soon criticized Sonosky and Laza-
rus for their pursuit of just compensation. The Sioux elders accused 
the attorneys of seeking a waiver of res judicata so that they could 
increase their contingency fee (p. 354). These allegations recurred, 
and eventually the Black Hills Sioux Nation Council called for the 
replacement of the attorneys - a request that carried no weight be-
cause the organization had no official authority. Later, after the no-
sale view swept the elected tribal governments, tribal councils refused 
to renew the attorneys' contracts. Nevertheless, Sonosky and Lazarus 
saw the case through to its conclusion (pp. 373, 403). 
Lazarus stresses two arguments in support of the just compensa-
tion strategy. First, Sonosky and Lazarus "saw no inherent incompat-
ibility in accepting money and seeking land" (p. 359). After receiving 
just compensation, the Sioux could seek return of religiously or cultur-
ally significant parts of the Black Hills from Congress. Second, the 
Sioux simply could not obtain the Black Hills through judicial pro-
ceedings. Although the Sioux believed they could recover the Hills by 
arguing that they had not been taken for a public purpose as required 
33, 242-43 (1984); Deloria, supra note 34, at 88 ("When traditional Indians raise complaints 
about the high-handed tactics of the Bureau of Indian Affairs in getting the tribes to adopt the 
IRA, or accuse the existing tribal government of being a white man's government, they have a 
great deal of historical fact behind their arguments ..•• "). 
37. Pp. 162-63, 186, 353-55. But see DELORIA & LYTLE, supra note 11, at 1 ("The perspec-
tive of the non-Indian, generally colored by the uncritical acceptance of cultural evolution as the 
definitive experience of our species, has rarely coincided with the view from the reservation."); 
MATIHIESSEN, supra note 3, at xxxii-xxxiii. 
38. Sioux Nation v. United States, 33 Ind. Cl. Comm. 151 (1974). 
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under the Fifth Amendment,39 Arthur Lazarus argued that "no fed-
eral court .ever had prevented, much less rescinded, a governmental 
taking on the ground that it was not for a public use. And regardless 
of the merits of ... [the] public use argument, Lazarus was certain 
that no federal court would even listen to [the] theory" because federal 
statutes forbade the return of Indian land. 40 
Furthermore, the book contends that the true reason the Sioux re-
jected a monetary award was that they would lose the "sustaining 
myth that they had never given in to the white man's deceits ... [and] 
would ... end forever their century-old grievance against the United 
States and diminish their status as still defiant victims of its expan-
sion" (p. 376). This opinion, coupled with the belief that a money 
award was the best available judicial remedy, leads to Lazarus' conclu-
sion that the Sioux should accept the judgment and get on with their 
lives. 
A reader might infer from its title that a book called Black Hills/ 
White Justice would be sympathetic to the Sioux Nation's struggle to 
regain their Sacred Black Hills. Lazarus' effort falls short of such 
sympathy. Instead, his account makes the Sioux look irrational and 
unappreciative of the "justice" that his father obtained through an ar-
duous legal struggle.41 
That Lazarus is writing about his father colors his authorial per-
39. U.S. CoNST. amend. V ("nor shall private property be taken for public use without just 
compensation"). 
40. P. 372. But Milner S. Ball argues: 
The Black Hills afford an example of curable wrong ..•• 
. . • Their counsel, inexplicably, acceded to the proposition that the United States could 
legally abrogate the Fort Laramie Treaty and that the United States held title to Sioux and 
all Indian land. • . • 
••• [T]he courts are not confined to money damages. They and the Congress could 
respond with flexibility. They could return the land, certainly at least those considerable 
portions of it that are public and are held by the federal government. Moreover the voice of 
the Sioux can certainly be better heard in the judicial process through a different quality of 
legal representation. 
Milner S. Ball, Stories of Origin and Constitutional Possibilities, 81 MICH. L. R.Ev. 2280, 2301-02 
(1989); see also Ward Churchill, The Black Hills Are Not For Sale: A Summary of the Lakota 
Struggle far the 1868 Treaty Territory, 18 J. ETHNIC STUD. 127, 135 (1988) (arguing that "[t]he 
game had always been rigged, and the legal strategy had (predictably) proven quite unsuccessful 
in terms of either achieving Lakota objectives or even holding the U.S. accountable to its own 
professed system of legality"). 
41. The author introduces the book in a compassionate manner, pronouncing: 
This book tells th[e] Black Hills history. It tells of an aboriginal people's movement to a 
new homeland on the great plains, and of how a burgeoning nation from the east conquered 
that people and took its land; it tells of a great legal battle - fought mainly by white men in 
the white man's courts - as the conquered sued the conqueror over the sins of empire. And 
it tells of an impoverished people seeking to reclaim their heritage through the sometimes 
tender conscience of the nation that robbed them of their way of life. 
P. xvi. By the end of the book, however, his tone has changed: 
As for the Sioux, the claims process has encouraged them to evade any real responsibility for 
repairing the tragic condition of their lives. They have come to believe that their status as 
victims, their sense of grievance, is their greatest source of strength and only hope for unity. 
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spective, 42 yet this is not the only factor that may lead the reader to 
question the author's loyalties.43 First, as Lazarus demonstrates, the 
American system of justice habitually slighted Native Americans (pp. 
241, 248). Yet he ignores the Sioux's counsel's role in this defective 
structure. 44 
Second, in a related issue that Lazarus does not explore, ethnocen-
tric biases can complicate the attorney-client relationship. Although 
the attorney, raised and trained in the dominant culture's system of 
justice, may feel he or she is pursuing the best solution available, the 
minority client may not agree. 45 
Native American conceptions of justice in land claims are substan-
tially influenced by their view of land. In general, Native Americans 
"understand the intrinsic value ofland as the sustenance of [their] cul-
ture."46 The Sioux were not trying to regain a lost measure of wealth 
or a resource that through productivity would yield riches; they were 
trying to recapture their sacred connection to nature: their cultural 
identity.47 They continue to be unwilling, after years of governmental 
allotment policy and tribal termination efforts, to betray this heritage. 
And in this belief the Sioux have abandoned any meaningful attempt to control their own 
destiny in favor of rhetorical claims to sovereignty and independence. 
P. 428. 
42. The relationship of Lazarus to his father also provides the important benefit of unique 
insights into the legal maneuvering on the case. P. 467. At the very beginning of the book, the 
author puts the reader on notice of his special relationship to the subject. P. ix. 
43. For insight into the problem of ethnocentric bias in writing Indian history, see Calvin 
Martin, The Metaphysics of Writing Indian· White History, in PROBLEM OF HISTORY, supra note 
34, at 27. 
44. See, e.g., Harvey D. Rosenthal, Indian Claims and the American Conscience, in IRRE· 
DEEMABLE AMERICA: THE INDIAN'S EsrATE AND LAND Cl.AIMS 35, 67-68 (lmre Sutton ed., 
1985) [hereinafter IRREDEEMABLE AMERICA]; Adams, supra note 13, at 21, 24-25. 
45. That the attorneys were hired on a contingent basis may further influence their amenabil-
ity to pursue the client's wishes that do not involve a potentially large monetary remedy. The 
attorney may find it difficult to follow the adage that "[a] lawyer must, within the established 
constraints on professional behavior, maximize the likelihood that the [client's objectives will be 
attained]." Murray L. Schwartz, The Professionalism and Accountability of Lawyers, 66 CAL. L. 
REV. 669, 673 (1978). 
46. Prolegomena, in IRREDEEMABLE AMERICA, supra note 44, at 36. One Indian perspective 
was summarized as follows: 
The government is always making laws, so many laws, every day new laws. Then they 
break every one. They use the law to cheat people, but that is not the Indian way. We have 
one law, God's law: to live on this earth with respect for all living things, and to be happy 
with what God has given to us. 
MATrHIESSEN, supra note 3, at 529 (quoting Chief Fools Crow); see also DELORIA & LYTLE, 
supra note 11, at 1 (discussing Indian notions of law and justice). 
47. See JERRY MANDER, IN THE ABsENCE OF THE SACRED: THE FAILURE OF TECHNOL· 
OGY AND THE SURVIVAL OF THE INDIAN NATIONS, 315-16 (1991) ("[T]he lawyers have been 
oblivious to what the Indians truly want, which is to retain land rather than be paid money. The 
land is the Indians' economic, cultural, and spiritual base ••• land is what permits them to 
remain Indians. The lawyers, however, seem always to go for the money"); IRREDEEMABLE 
AMERICA, supra note 44, at 4-7. For Lazarus' description of the sacred nature of the land to the 
Sioux, see pp. 7-8; see also Richard Pemberton, Jr., ''/Saw That It Was Holy'~· Tlze Black Hills 
and the Concept of Sacred Land, 3 LAW & INEQ. J. 287, 292-93. 
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The Sioux counsel chose to ignore the supplication of their clients and 
hid behind the rationalization that they represented the legitimate in-
terests of the Sioux as expressed by the tribal councils that had hired 
them.48 
Lazarus appears rash in his quick dismissal of the Sioux's possible 
opportunities to pursue the return of land through the judicial sys-
tem. 49 As it stands, however, the judgment in Sioux Nation has qui-
eted title to their claims and left the Sioux resentful that their 
conquerors may peacefully rest with the false belief that justice has 
been realized. One may agree with Lazarus that the Sioux should stop 
playing the victim.50 Alternatively, one could accept the intuition of a 
noted scholar of Native American history who recently wrote about 
the misperceptions regarding Native American protests: 
Some [Native American] voices ... may appear to be complaining about 
the loss of land, the loss of a way of life or the continuing propensity of 
the white man to change the terms of the debate to favor himself. But 
deep down these are cries about dignity, complaints about the lack of 
respect.51 
Black Hills/White Justice ignores these cries; however, the reader who 
keeps Lazarus' partisanship in mind will find his effort an important 
and engaging account of the Sioux claim. 
- Martin J. LaLonde 
48. One of Lazarus' main points, that the Sioux did accept their attorneys' pursuit of the 
money award as the appropriate strategy, may be attacked from two perspectives. First, the 
tribal governments that approved this strategy were arguably illegitimate; they represented the 
U.S. government's interests more than those of their Sioux constituents. See supra notes 33-37 
and accompanying text. The "traditionals," whose views eventually prevailed in the tribal gov-
ernments, held to Crazy Horse's admonition that "[y]ou do not sell the land the people walk on." 
P. 417. Second, the disempowered Sioux may have felt they had no other option but to accept 
money. See, e.g., Adams, supra note 13, at 24. 
49. For other strategies that could have been pursued, see Ball, supra note 40, at 2301-02. 
50. P. 428. Lazarus also describes the Sioux's alternative recourse for their grievances 
through Congress. Pp. 414-27. 
51. Vine Deloria, Jr. Foreword, in NATIVE AMERICAN TEsTIMONY: A CHRONICLE OF IN-
DIAN-WHITE RELATIONS FROM THE PROPHECY TO THE PRESENT, 1492-1992, at XXII (Peter 
Nabokov ed., 1992). 
